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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
monthly deficiencies of rental the tenant must plainly remain liable
for rent during his term surviving eviction or, where his term under
the covenant of the lease ceases upon such eviction, clear expression
must show that his damages were to be computed monthly on the
rental loss sustained through reletting, for to hold him to liability in
the latter case is to place upon him a burden possibly heavier than he
sustains for a deficiency at the end of the term. "He must pay in the
lean months without recouping in the fat ones. He must do this
though it may turn out in the end that there has been a gain and not
a loss." But where the damages are computed at the end of the term
his liability is determined by allowing him all sums collected so that
there might be a deficiency. "A liability so heavy may not rest upon
uncertain inference."
Rather evidently by the drafting of this last clause the Hermi-
tage Company failed in its purpose. To quote Judge Cardozo again; 
2 4
"We do not overlook the hardship to the landlord in post-
poning the cause of action until October, 1945. The hardship
is so great as to give force to the argument that postponement
to a date so distant may not reasonably be held to have been
intended by the parties. There is no reason to suppose, how-
ever, that the landlord was expectant of so early a default or
so heavy a deficiency. It had in its possession a deposit of
cash security in the sum of $30,000. Very likely this was
supposed to be enough to make default improbable and the
risk of loss remote. If the damage clause as drawn gives
inadequate protection, the fault is with the draftsman. The
courts are not at liberty to supply its omissions at the expense
of a tenant whose liability for the future ended with the can-
cellation of the lease except in so far as he bound himself by
covenant to liability thereafter."
G. M. B.
VALIDITY OF STATE SUPERVISION OF SECRET SocIETIEs.-A
member of a secret society who was held in custody to answer a
charge of violating a New York statute brought a proceeding in
habeas corpus to obtain his discharge on the ground that the warrant
under which he was arrested and detained was issued without juris-
diction in that the statute, with violation of which he was charged,
was unconstitutional.' The offense alleged was that he attended
"' Supra Note 3, 248 N. Y. at 338.
'People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman.
NOTES AND COMMENT
meetings and remained a member of the Buffalo Provisional Klan of
the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,2 he then having knowledge that
such association had wholly failed to comply with the requirements of
the Walker Law.3
The petition for habeas corpus, while asserting that the state
statute was unconstitutional, contained no mention of any constitu-
tional provision, state or federal, which petitioner claimed was
2 (An unincorporated association, neither a labor union nor benevolent
order, as mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law, having a membership of
more than 20 persons and requiring an oath as a prerequisite or condition of
membership.) Consol. Laws of N. Y., Chap. 3.
' Civil Rights Laws, Secs. 53-56 inclusive:
"Section 53. Copies of documents and statements to be filed. Every
existing membership corporation, and every existing unincorporated association
having a membership of twenty or more persons, which corporation or associa-
tion requires an oath as a prerequisite or condition of membership, other than
a labor union or a benevolent order mentioned in the benevolent orders law,
within thirty days after this article takes effect, and every such corporation or
association hereafter organized, within ten days after the adoption thereof,
shall file with the secretary of state a sworn copy of its constitution, by-laws,
rules, regulations and oath of membership together with a roster of its member-
ship and a list of its officers for the current year. Every such corporation and
association shall, in case its constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations or oath of
membership or any part thereof, be revised, changed or amended, within ten
days after such revision or amendment file with the secretary of state a sworn
copy of such revised, changed or amended constitution, by-law, rule, regulation
or oath of membership. Every such corporation or association shall within
thirty days after a change has been made in its officers file with the secretary
of state a sworn statement showing such change. Every such corporation or
association shall at intervals of six months file with the secretary of state a
sworn statement showing the names and addresses of such additional members
as have been received in such corporation or association during such interval.
"Section 54. Resolutions Concerning Political Matters. Every such cor-
poration or association shall, within ten days after the adoption thereof, file in
the office of the secretary of state every resolution, or the minutes of any
action of such corporation or association, providing for concerted action of its
members or of a part thereof to promote or defeat legislation, federal, state or
municipal, or to support or to defeat any candidate for political office.
"Section 55. Anonymous Communications Prohibited. It shall be unlaw-
ful for any such corporation or association to send, deliver, mail or transmit to
any person in this state who is not a member of such corporation or association
any anonymous letter, document, leaflet or other written or printed matter, and
all such letters, documents, leaflets or other written or printed matter, intended
for a person not a member of such corporation or association, shall bear on the
same the name of such corporation or association, and the names of the officers
thereof together with the addresses of the latter.
"Section 56. Offenses; Penalties. Any corporation or association vio-
lating any provision of this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand
dollars. Any officer of such corporation or association and every member of
the board of directors, trustees or other similar body, who violates any
provision of this article or permits or acquiesces in the violation of any
provision of this article by any such corporation shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor. Any person who becomes a member of any such corporation or
association, or remains a member thereof, or attends a meeting thereof, with
knowledge that such corporation or association has failed to comply with any
provision of this article, shill be guilty of a misdemeanor."
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violated. The trial court sustained the validity of the statute and
refused to discharge the petitioner,4 and on appeal that judgment was
affirmed by the Appellate Division 5 and by the Court of Appeals.6
The opinion delivered by the court of first instance was similarly
indefinite in its reference to a constitutional provision. The first
mention of violation of a specific constitutional provision is found in
the opinion of the Appellate Division which distinctly stated that the
relator's claim of invalidity was based on an asserted deprivation of
rights secured to him by the "due process" clause of both state and
federal constitutions.7 Nor does the Court of Appeals, in its opinion,
elaborate upon the charge of unconstitutionality. No mention is
made of the 14th Amendment though the decision does state that the
relator asserted the unconstitutionality of the statute on the ground
that it deprived him of his liberty without "due process" of law and
denied him the "equal protection" of the laws. There is nothing to
indicate an abandonment, by the relator, of his reliance on the 14th
Amendment as distinctly stated in the opinion of the Appellate Divi-
sion. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals' discussion of the case
and its citation of authorities proceeded as if it were considering the
identical claim of invalidity mentioned in the opinion of the Appellate
Division and there denied. As a matter of fact, the opinion of the
Court of Appeals shows that in denying the relator's petition it prac-
tically rested its decision on the authority of Radice v. N. Y.,8 where
another statute of New York had been assailed as in conflict with
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
Following this unsuccessful effort to obtain his freedom, the
relator sued out a writ of error under the judicial Code,9 which pro-
vides in part that the United States Supreme Court may review upon
writ of error "a final judgment or decree in any suit in the court of
last resort of a state where is drawn in question the validity of a
statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the
constitution, treaties or laws of the United States and the decision is
in favor of its validity." Although the action was one brought pri-
marily to test the validity of a state statute, several important points
covering the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court were clearly set forth
by Mr. justice Van Devanter in an interesting and instructive opinion.
In substance, he stated that although a petitioner makes no specific
mention of constitutional provisions, and the highest court of the
state rules against the petitioner without expressly referring to any
constitutional provision, yet no particular form of words or phrases
is necessary to draw in question the validity of a state statute.
" 123 Misc. 859, 206 N. Y. Supp. 533 (1924).
'213 App. Div. 414, 210 N. Y. Supp. 269 (1925).
0241 N. Y. 405, 43 A. L. R. 909, 150 N. E. 497 (1926).
7 N. Y. Const. Art 1, Sec. 6; U. S. Const. 14th Amendment.
8264 U. S. 292, 296, 297, 68 L. ed. 690, 695, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325 (1923).
'Sec. 237A.
NOTES AND COMMENT
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review the decision
was also questioned because of the nature of the case, it being a
proceeding in habeas corpus to obtain the discharge of one held in
custody to answer a charge of violating a state statute, the validity
of that statute never having been determined. Mr. Justice Van
Devanter dismissed this contention by citing the early case of Holmes
v. Jennison,' 0 where the Supreme Court held, after careful considera-
tion, that a proceeding in habeas corpus in a state court to obtain the
release of one held in custody on a criminal charge where the deten-
tion is alleged to be in violation of the constitution of the United
States is a suit within the meaning of the Judicial Code 11 and that an
order of the state court of last resort refusing to discharge him is a
final judgment subject to review by the United States Supreme
Court. This phase of the opinion is supported by an unbroken line
of later decisions, all of which, in their material facts, were similar to
the instant case.1 2
The court, after disposing of this jurisdictional point, then pro-
ceeded to a consideration of the validity of the statute in question.
In a careful review of relator's contention that under the "due
process" clause the statute deprived him of liberty by preventing him
from exercising his right of membership in the association, the court
pointed out that if any privilege arose out of citizenship it was an
incident of state rather than United States citizenship and such pro-
tection as is thrown about it by the state constitution is in no wise
affected by its possessor being a citizen of the United States.13 There
can be no doubt but that petitioner's liberty in this regard, like most
other personal rights, must yield to lawful exercise of the police
power, and that the requirements of the Walker Law are a reasonable
regulation established for the two-fold purpose of informing the
state, within whose territory and under whose protection the associa-
tion exists, of the nature and purpose of that association; of whom
it is composed; and by whom its acts are conducted; and also of
requiring this information to be supplied for the public files and
" 14 Pet. (U. S.) 540, 563, 568, 597, 10 L. ed. 579, 590, 593, 607 (1840).
' Supra Note 9.
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 508, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804,
8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564 (1888) ; Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650, 41 L. ed. 586,
17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214 (1896); New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr,
199 U. S. 552, 50 L. ed. 305, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144 (1905) ; New York ex rel.
Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31, 53 L. ed. 75, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10 (1908);
North Dakota ex rel. Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U. S. 515, 54 L. ed. 307, 30 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 179 (1909) ; Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 56 L. ed. 439, 32 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 286 (1911); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 59 L. ed. 835, 35 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 501 (1914).
'Slaughter House cases, 16 Wall. 36, 77, et seq. 21 L. ed. 394, 409 (1872)
Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 139, 21 L. ed. 442, 445 (1872); Bartemeyer
v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 133, 21 L. ed. 929, 930 (1873); Minor v. Happersett,
21 Wall. 162, 171, 22 L. ed. 627, 629 (1874) ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U. S. 542, 551, 552, 23 L. ed. 588, 590, 591 (1875); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148
U. S. 657, 661, 37 L. ed. 599, 601, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 721 (1892) ; Re Lockwood,
154 U. S. 116, 117, 38 L. ed. 929, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1082 (1893).
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thereby effecting a substantial deterrent to violations of public and
private rights. It is a natural consequence that power to require this
disclosure also includes the authority to prevent individual members
of an association, which has failed to comply with the statute, from
remaining members or participating in the activities of the organiza-
tion if they have knowledge of its default.
The petitioner further contended that the statute discriminates
against the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and other associations in
that several associations having oath-bound membership such as the
labor unions, Masonic fraternity, the Independent Order of Odd
Fellows, and Knights of Columbus, are excepted from the require-
ments. It is to be noted that these organizations, claimed to be
excepted, are all specifically mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law
of New York State, which provides for their incorporation and re-
quires the names of their officers as elected from time to time to be
reported to the Secretary of State. Furthermore, the equal protec-
tion clause does not detract from the right of the state to justly exert
its police power or prevent it from adjusting its legislation to differ-
ences in circumstances or forbid classification in that connection, but
it does require that the classification be not arbitrary but based on a
real and substantial difference having a reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular legislation. Mere evidence of apparent
inequality, however, is not enough to invalidate a statute. The state
is free to recognize degrees of potential good and evil and may
confine its legislation to those classes of cases where the need is
deemed to be clearest. The courts below in reviewing this right
recognized clearly the demand for equal protection and were justified
in finding the difference between the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
and the associations specifically excepted from the statute. In point-
ing out this difference the courts said of the Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that this organiza-
tion functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods
and gowns, and doing things calculated to strike terror into
the minds of the people."
and in distinguishing the excepted class:
"These organizations and their purposes are well known,
many of them having been in existence for many years. Many
of them are oath-bound and secret, but we hear no complaints
against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering
with the rights of others. The benevolent orders mentioned
in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received legisla-
tive scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that
the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than
harmful agencies."
NOTES AND COMMENT
It is plain that the action of the courts in holding that there was a
real and substantial basis for the distinction made between the two
sets of associations or orders was a correct conclusion. In the one
case we find an apparent tendency to make the secrecy surrounding
its purposes and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to
personal rights and public welfare, while in the other class there is a
total absence of such tendency.
As to the last contention of petitioner, that the classification is an
arbitrary one in that it is confined to associations having a member-
ship of twenty or more persons, the Supreme Court ruled that such
legislation is not unreasonable. A state may well decide for itself
that an association of less than twenty persons would have only a
negligible influence and any measure to restrain it would not be
necessary.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Van Devanter indicates clearly that
the Supreme Court will give a petitioner every consideration on his
plea of unconstitutionality, yet they will refuse to interfere with the
inherent police power of the sovereign state to regulate its internal
affairs.
W. E. C.
DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE DIVIDENDS BETWEEN LIFE TEN-
ANT AND REMAINDERAN.-The courts are frequently called upon
to decide whether a particular distribution of a corporation to its
stockholders is income for the benefit of a life tenant or capital to
be added to the corpus of the trust estate for the benefit of the
remainderman.
Over fifty years ago the New York Court of Appeals said that
"It will be the duty of the Court, when the occasion arises, to seek to
settle the question upon principle and establish a rule for the guidance
of trustees and others" 1 but the court is still without a definite rule,
determination in each case resting upon its own facts and circum-
stances.
2
Decisions on the subject have opened the door to much con-
fusion as an examination of a few cases under the various rules
will show.
Early English Rule.
The early English rule, now partially obsolete, established as far
back as 1799, states that all ordinary cash dividends shall be paid to
1 Riggs v. Cragg, 89 N. Y. 487 (1882).
'In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, at 475, 103 N. E. 723, at 730 (1913).
